The contingency-fee system, which allows lawyers and their clients to agree that the lawyer will be paid only in the event of success, does not increase the number of medical malpractice lawsuits brought against doctors. As attorneys must cover the costs for their time and research, they want to be assured that any medical malpractice case they accept on a contingency-fee basis has substantial merit. Consequently, attorneys turn away many people who come to see them, for lack of a good case.
The argument above is most vulnerable to criticism on the grounds that it fails to
specify the criteria attorneys use to judge the merits of a medical malpractice case
consider whether, in the absence of a contingency-fee option, even people with meritorious cases are much less likely to initiate litigation if they believe they might incur large legal fees
note whether, in successful medical malpractice lawsuits, the average monetary award after legal costs have been deducted is less under contingency-fee arrangements than otherwise
consider the effect of the contingency-fee system on the number of lawsuits sought for reasons other than medical malpractice
acknowledge the rising cost of medical malpractice insurance
我不太懂。。。这道题的论点难道不是——胜诉制度不会增加医疗失误的诉讼数量吗?那我这个逻辑和胜诉制度外的任何事情有关系吗。。。没有这个胜诉option人们诉讼量增多增少不影响胜诉制度单边对医疗失误的诉讼数量的影响啊?为什么b是对的......
没太看懂你在说啥,说一下我对这道题的想法吧。 前提:现在官司打赢才给钱,不赢不要钱。理论上这个制度会增加很多官司,但是医疗官司的量没提高(P.S.虽然我并不知道为什么这个制度会导致官司数量提高)。结论:肯定是律师把没胜算的官司都拒绝了。问削弱? B说很多人就算知道能打赢,但是律师费很高,所以不值得提出诉讼。很好的削弱了结论,都没人对医疗官司提起诉讼,何来拒绝变多?
律师拒绝没胜算的官司是原因
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